



SOMASUNDARAM

Director, Research, Akara Research & Technologies



● DEMONETISATION

Where is the impact of currency ban

The banking volume—deposits that have grown and credit that has shrunk—was too insignificant to have had an impact on the economic life of citizens in most parts of India

FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT of demonetisation on November 8, 2016, there was a mixed response, with an initial widespread cheer. However, as the magnitude of scale of operations started emerging, there was considerable opposition. After the electoral success for the BJP post-demonetisation, it was argued by some that demonetisation had the acceptance of the citizens as an effort to cleanse the system, while others argued it was marketed by right packaging. But data released by RBI shows that there has not been any impact in most places due to demonetisation. It also reveals that there is an urgent need to revisit the financial inclusion strategies put in place so far.

While demonetisation was not unheard of, the scale this time was unprecedented. It was reported that about 86% of the notes in circulation were in the form of ₹1,000 and ₹500, indicating the scale of operations that would ensue.

Demonetisation and quarterly growth

Indian banking witnesses a cyclical pattern in quarterly growth (chart 1), with generally higher growth in deposits during the fourth quarter. In 2016-17, the Q3 growth reached the highest in the last five years. In terms of credit (chart 2), Q4 has the highest growth, which has an effect in the subsequent year's Q1. Q3 usually registers a positive growth rate which gets accelerated in the subsequent Q4. In 2016-17, Q2 maintained the trend seen in the last few years, but Q3 credit growth fell flat as an immediate impact of demonetisation.

There are some possible reasons for this. One, households in the lower income districts have had more cash in hand and had to deposit the same in banks. Two, more accounts were opened, and had helped out some of the cash hoarders in their regions. There were also reports of new bank accounts being opened by migrant labourers

in cities to transfer money to their home-towns and families in rural areas. RBI has not released the data on the number of accounts for these quarters.

District-level analysis of deposit and credit

We look at India's districts in terms of per-capita deposit and credit; the districts are grouped in terms of percentile. We have considered Q3 data as it pertains to the demonetisation period. Moreover, there is unusual growth in per-capita deposits in Q3 of 2016-17 compared to Q3 in recent years.

A distinct feature of growth in Q3 is that districts with lower base of deposit—both total deposits and per-capita levels—have shown higher growth of deposit. Districts with a higher base of deposit. Districts in the bottom percentile in terms of per-capita deposit have registered a higher average growth rate in Q3 of 2016-17.

In terms of growth rate of per-capita credit in Q3 of each year since 2012-13, there has been uniform shrinking of credit growth across all percentiles. Though this would have an impact on the macro level, in per-capita terms the impact is meagre.

India's districts are distributed with a high skew in terms of banking parameters, reflective of the Lorenz curve of India's income distribution. While 70% of the country's 600-odd districts have less than ₹30,000 in terms of per-capita deposit, 70% of the districts have a per-capita credit of less than ₹18,000.

While focus was on the conversion of existing cash to new currencies, the greater issue was the lack of lower denomination banknotes (₹50, ₹100). At such low per-capita levels of banking finance, the lack of lower denomination notes was the underlying issue, and not the amount *per se*. In at least 50% of the districts, the weekly withdrawal limit was well within what the citizen could muster for an entire quarter. While hundreds stood repeatedly in queues, thousands watched, and may have felt, "How much cash were they hoarding? Whose cash are they exchanging?" One question that is still inconclusive is whether non-availability of cash in the required denomination implied non-availability of value and incomes?

This analysis hides regional and state-level issues. Tamil Nadu is a significant outlier. Excluding Chennai, we have a near-perfect distribution of the districts. Both per-capita deposit and per-capita credit outstanding are higher than national average at the bottom percentiles. Tamil Nadu is one state where there would have been higher impact on the people due to demonetisation, because of higher per-capita credit outstanding, which has shrunk due to demonetisation.

Punjab and Haryana are other outliers. The lowest percentile starts at ₹40,000 for per-capita deposit, and ₹35,000 for per-capita credit—about 10 times higher than the national average for the lowest percentile. Thus, districts of India can be grouped into the following categories:

- Urban-driven districts that have had historic payoffs like Mumbai;
- New urban centres like Coimbatore and Tiruppur, and in terms of scale, Bengaluru;
- Select states like Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Haryana driven by high per-capita income;
- The rest of India trying to migrate to any one of these above categories.

Districts in the top percentiles are concentrated in the northern, western and southern parts of India. The heartland and eastern parts are in the lowest percentile.

The banking volume—deposits that have grown and credit that has shrunk—was too insignificant to have had an impact on the economic life of citizens in most parts of India. What the data reveals is the persistently low level of financial inclusion, despite various efforts. The data also reveals that higher income states are also those with better banking reach and financial inclusion. It would have been interesting if there had been a state-level election in Tamil Nadu, where, as we have already seen, credit at per-capita level is equally high as deposits. It is imperative to strategise digital finance and its penetration to empower a larger section of population and achieve a liberal reach of economic opportunities.

(Ajay R, Research Associate at Akara, executed requisite statistical analysis of RBI data)

A trap called globalisation

MY KHAN

Former Economic Advisor, Sebi

In India, globalisation is leading to growth both of a new generation of young and rich, and millions of poor

Globalisation has raised questions in terms of emerging volatility, uncertainty, rise in poverty, and inequality in economic status of people in developing countries. It is said that globalisation is a hollow gift for the developing world and an award for rich countries from the WTO—hence a painful gap is visible between haves and have nots. However, globalisation is not a recent phenomenon; it started since the dawn of colonisation, including of India, when traders of the British Empire took away raw materials like cotton and jute for production in Lancashire and the same returned to India in the form of fine fabrics. Because India was a colony of Britain, this trade was imposed upon us. The same process was taking shape in the colonies of Portugal and Spain, especially in Africa.

But this form of trade changed after independence of India and other countries, and since then, a new turn took place in the structure of global trade—a kind of distortion of global trade on account of cut-throat competition that was followed by the forming of regional trading blocks such as the European Economic Community and European Free Trade Association, Latin American Free Trade Association, Andean Group, ASEAN, and COMECON. We can call this movement regional globalisation, which partially related to the whole world in terms of trade and technology. Later on, these regional trading blocks started intervening among each other's trade, shifting their professional labour and technology. Following the birth of the WTO came professionalised globalisation—the age we are living in today.

Of course, globalisation offers advantages such as production-scale efficiency, innovative technology, efficient utilisation of labour, net of tax price equalisation, and equalisation of productive world savings and free flow of investment. In fact, the WTO provided incentives to invest of investment, technical knowledge, professionals and consumers.

However, globalisation has facilitated both investing and withdrawing funds at such speed that even financial growth finds it hard to keep up with the frequency of volatility in financial markets. Take the example of Intel. The company has been making its microchips while lowering the cost per chip to gain market share at an accelerated rate. It's nothing but expelling rivals to retain competitiveness and achieving monopolisation.

Intel also moved most of its manufacturing capacities from the West to countries like Malaysia, Ireland, Israel, Turkey, North Korea and China, giving the company access to cheap and trained labour, and making it geographically close to its major markets.



In India, globalisation is leading to growth of a new generation of young and rich, and then there are millions of rural and urban poor—and this inequality is growing. The rich are becoming preoccupied with their own advancement, given global complexities, the poor are in a state of existential poverty. A step to improve the excessively low poverty line in India is to base it on a "nutritious" food security line, and then include education, sanitation, permanent housing and so on as part of the criteria.

Considering the size of India and her economic growth, poverty differs greatly from one state to another, so poverty lines should be adapted to each state and updated regularly. India is also infamous for child labour and underpayment. Solving this issue requires a different approach for towns and cities (factories) and for rural areas (agriculture).

For the last few years, India has not been able to attract substantial foreign capital, its exports have slowed, and agriculture and manufacturing are registering muted growth. If a major part of the population remains poor and is denied opportunities to become self-sufficient, the impact would be felt across the country and the results could be destabilising.

Yet another unrest is seen among retired citizens. Public expenditure on pensions and healthcare could double by 2040. So, India has to focus on two issues—slowing of population growth and increasing employment opportunities by augmenting agricultural and industrial production. Agricultural sector would need better irrigation resources, fertilisers and mechanisation. India also lacks skilled staff in sectors like manufacturing, transport and financial. The government is working to reduce inequality and is extending its forces to unite the scattered countries into one universe of peace and productivity.

(Ajay R, Research Associate at Akara, executed requisite statistical analysis of RBI data)



AS NORTH KOREAN dictator Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump's war of words escalates, Independence Day celebrations—commemorating the Korean Peninsula's 1945 liberation from Japanese rule—are unfolding in both North and South Korea. The occasion underscores not just the shared history between the two countries, but also the South's unique qualifications to bring about a peaceful resolution to the current military standoff.

As much as Kim may enjoy threatening the most powerful country in the world, the US has never been North Korea's primary target. On the contrary, the North's real objective has always been to ensure the survival of the Kim regime and, in the longer term, to secure the reunification of the Korean Peninsula under that regime's leadership. South Korea thus faces the most acute danger, and has the strongest incentive to alleviate tensions with the North.

That goal will not be advanced by South Korea's annual joint military exercise with the US, Ulchi-Freedom Guardian (UFG), which is geared towards preparing both countries for a conflict with the North. On the contrary, with sabre-rattling between North Korea and the US at an all-time high, the exercise—which will begin on August 21—could escalate the conflict dramatically.

Even in normal times, North Korea reacts angrily to UFG. Last year, it tested its fifth nuclear device just after the exercises were held. But now that North Korea is overtly threat-

Can South Korea save the day?

KATHARINE HS MOON

(Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, US)



ening to launch missiles at the US territory of Guam, and being provoked by Trump, its response to another round of UFG could be less symbolic, and far more devastating.

If North Korea lashes out, the strategy of deterrence that underpins the US-South Korea alliance will have been fatally undermined. Deterrence means using a credible threat of punishment to prevent an opponent from initiating military engagement. And yet North Korea has already dismissed Trump's threats as a "load of nonsense." If this month's war games trigger a military confrontation or an outright exchange of fire, deterrence will officially have failed.

The problem is that, even if Trump and Kim recognise the corner into which they

have painted themselves, neither has the political space to backpedal on their threats without risking serious domestic and international humiliation.

Worse still, both leaders lack credibility in the eyes of the other, and the world. China's leaders have long viewed Trump as unreliable, or "bu kaopu." Now, Trump's emotional response to North Korea's actions has further reinforced that assessment, and given Chinese leaders even less of a reason to get involved in the drama. Even Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has been Trump's most steadfast supporter among East Asian leaders, is wary of the domestic political consequences of Trump's brinkmanship.

Of course, Japan, as North Korea's uti-



mate historical enemy, would have no leverage over Kim anyway. The only country with the credibility, leverage and motivation to lead the way towards a peaceful resolution to the current crisis is South Korea. But South Korea has so far straddled the line between antagonism and diplomacy.

On the one hand, South Korea agrees with Trump on the need for tougher sanctions and military readiness, including full deployment of the US anti-ballistic missile defence system, known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD. On the other hand, it has indicated that it would be willing to engage in joint military talks and diplomatic dialogue with North Korea, and it even invited Kim's government to participate in a

joint Independence Day celebration. (The North refused, citing the planned UFG.)

South Korea needs to take a stronger approach. Rather than shove a weak opponent into a corner and risk them lashing out, South should request indefinite postponement of this year's UFG, which would be counterproductive and is not essential at this time. The US and South Korea already held massive joint exercises involving 320,000 troops—more than six times the combined troop strength of the planned UFG—in March and April of this year, and in 2016.

During that period, the US also deployed a strike group, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, to the region, saying that it would counter "reckless

acts of aggression" with "whatever methods the US wants to take." The US also docked one of the largest nuclear-powered submarines in the world, the USS Michigan, in South Korea, and held "decapitation exercises" to prepare troops to infiltrate North Korea and eliminate Kim and his ruling cohort.

Simply put, this month's UFG exercises are far from critical to the US-South Korea alliance. By suspending them, South Korea would have an opportunity to pursue inter-Korean military-to-military dialogue with the North, while reinstating basic communications channels, including hotlines, which were cut off early last year. The South should also urge its northern counterpart to coordinate the commemoration of Independence Day, a near-sacred day for all Koreans, as a symbolic gesture of a unified Korean past and possible future.

To be sure, South Korean President Moon Jae-in's administration has made such overtures, and to no avail. But it may be more successful if it can use a postponed UFG as leverage. In the event, South Korea would emerge as a legitimate broker in the conflict between the US and North Korea, rather than as a US lackey, as the Kim regime likes to view it. That would greatly improve the prospects of a future negotiation among the three actors, once things have cooled down.

South Korea, with its affinity to both the US and North Korea, is uniquely suited to defuse the current situation. The stakes are too high for it not to try.

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